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Merger Settlement and Enforcement Policy for
Optimal Deterrence and Maximum Welfare
Steven C. Salop
Abstract
Merger enforcement today relies on settlements more than litigation to resolve
anticompetitive concerns. The impact of settlement policy on welfare and the proper
goals of settlement policy are highly controversial. Some argue that gun-shy agencies
settle for too little while others argue that agencies use their power to delay to extract
over-reaching settlement terms, even when mergers are not welfare-reducing. This
article uses decision theory to throw light on this controversy. The goal of this article is
to formulate and analyze agency merger enforcement and settlement commitment
policies in the face of imperfect information, litigation costs, and delay risks by the
merging parties, agencies, and the courts. The article explains why limiting the goal of
merger enforcement and agency settlement policy simply to avoiding welfare harms (but
no more) is flawed as a matter of both law and policy and would compromise deterrence.
The decision-theoretic analysis distinguishes two types of agency commitment policies: a
short-run optimal policy that focuses only the specific merger proposal being evaluated; a
long-run optimal policy that takes into account effects on future mergers and deterrence
goals. The short-run optimal policy may lead to some welfare-reducing settlements by a
rationally gun-shy agency; settlement demands for weakly welfare-enhancing merger
proposals, what might be called “exacting tribute;” and “anti-deterrence” effects by
merging firms proposing some mergers with greater welfare harm in order to increase
settlement bargaining leverage. In contrast, a disciplined long-run optimal policy would
clear all welfare-enhancing mergers as-proposed; forgo negative welfare settlements
despite the risk of losing in court, but instead demand settlements on welfare-reducing
merger proposals sufficient to lead to strict welfare increases (not just welfare-neutrality),
relative to no merger; and avoid anti-deterrence by demanding larger settlements for
more harmful mergers. Deterrence also would be improved if last-minute voluntary
divestiture agreements were not treated as part of the merger agreement evaluated by the
court, contrary to the approach taken in Arch Coal and other cases.
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Merger Settlement and Enforcement Strategy for
Optimal Deterrence and Maximum Welfare
Steven C. Salop1
I. Introduction and Overview
Mergers are the central focus of civil antitrust enforcement by governmental
antitrust agencies. Almost all proposed mergers in the US are cleared as-proposed. For
example, fewer than 3% of the mergers that were reported under the HSR process in
1999-2011in the U.S. received second requests and about 30% of these are cleared asproposed. Most of the rest were settled by consent decree or voluntary restructuring.
Some are abandoned by the parties in response to agency settlement demands or threats
of litigation. Only a few were litigated in court. Fewer than 2% of mergers that received
second requests reached an adjudicated judgment.
Because of the low percentage of adjudicated cases, merger enforcement has been
characterized as a regulatory system, rather than law enforcement. 2 Of course, this is an
overstatement. Most law enforcement systems involve plea bargaining with few cases
actually going to trial. 3 A high settlement rate is not surprising in light of the cost and
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For example, see A. Douglas Melamed, Antitrust: The New Regulation, 10 ANTITRUST 13 (1995). See
also Michael L. Weiner, Antitrust and the Rise of the Regulatory Consent Decree, 10 ANTITRUST 4 (1995);
Spencer W. Waller, Prosecution by Regulation: The Changing Nature of Antitrust Enforcement, 77 OR. L.
REV. 1383 (1998).
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uncertainty of litigation. Merger settlements do not simply have the goal of economizing
on litigation costs, achieving certainty and preventing delays. Settlements also should
serve two overarching policy goals of (i) preventing specific mergers from lessening
competition, while preserving welfare benefits; and (ii) deterring future anticompetitive
mergers. Achieving these twin enforcement goals in an efficient way requires careful
analysis.
Achieving these goals is complicated by the fact that merger analysis involves
inherent uncertainty. 4 Agency competitive effects analysis typically occurs before the
merger is consummated in a fairly short period of time on the basis of limited
information. If the agency predicts that the merger likely will reduce welfare, it must
defend its prediction to a judge who generally is not an antitrust expert. This means that
agency settlement demands and settlement negotiations are tightly connected to litigation;
a breakdown in the negotiations is the precursor to trial. Settlement demands also must
take into account the potential for errors by the agencies and the courts.
This means that a key merger policy issue is the appropriate settlement demand. 5
The current posture of the agencies has generated great controversy . Some argue that the
agencies are over-reaching in their settlement demands, while others argue that the
agencies are gun-shy and too readily accept welfare-reducing settlements in order to
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Michael L. Katz & Howard A. Shelanski, Merger Analysis and the Treatment of Uncertainty: Should We
Expect Better? 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 537 (2007); Ken Heyer, A World of Uncertainty: Economics and the
Globalization of Antitrust, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 375 (2005); Jonathan B. Baker & Carl Shapiro, Evaluating
Merger Enforcement During the Obama Administration, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 28 (2012).
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For an overview of settlement policy, see Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, The Nature
and Limits of Restructuring in Merger Review, Remarks at Cutting Edge Antitrust Conference (Feb. 17,
2000) (transcript available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/restruct.htm). For a discussion of
achieving effective divestitures, see, e.g., William J. Baer & Ronald C. Redcay, Solving Competition
Problems in Merger Control: The Requirements for an Effective Divestiture Remedy, 69 GEO. WASH. L.
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avoid the risk of litigation. For example, Joe Sims and Michael McFalls conclude that
the agency settlement regime has led to bureaucratic over-reaching that harms consumers
and the merging parties. 6 They suggest that the government has the upper hand in
settlement negotiations because of its power to delay the resolution of the merger. They
suggest that the agencies use this delay power to demand excessive divestitures, what
might be labeled as “extracting tribute.” To prevent this harmful over-aggressiveness,
Sims and McFalls suggest that the agencies instead should adopt a policy based on what
they call the “principle of minimal intrusion,” that is, the minimal divestiture necessary to
prevent welfare harm, relative to the no merger outcome. 7 Thomas Barnett, the DOJ
AAG during the second George W. Bush administration, expresses a similar goal. 8
In contrast, Lawrence Frankel concludes that the design of the enforcement
system leads to systematic under-enforcement and excessive false negatives. 9 According
to Frankel, the agencies have weaker bargaining leverage caused by informational
disadvantages, the need carry the burden of proof in court, where decisions are reviewed
by generalist judges, and a fear of losing in court. He suggests that the agencies settle for
divestitures that leave consumers worse off. 10
6

Joe Sims & Michael McFalls, Negotiated Merger Remedies: How Well Do They Solve Competition
Problems, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 932 (2001). See also Joe Sims & Deborah P. Herman, The Effect of
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Consequences Applied to Antitrust Legislation, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 865 (1997); Melamed, supra note 2.
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The goal of this article is to analyze these issues through a decision-theoretic lens.
It focuses on the role of imperfect information and litigation costs in driving optimal
enforcement and settlement policy. 11 This article does not analyze the form or structure
of the remedy. 12 Instead, it focuses on the appropriate aggressiveness of agency
settlement and enforcement strategy. This article assumes that the goal of merger policy
is to maximize expected welfare. 13
This analysis involves a number of related questions: Should the agencies ever
offer or accept settlements, rather than adopting a “just say no” stance to anticompetitive
mergers and litigating them all, while clearing all procompetitive mergers as-proposed?
11

These issues have been studied by a number of other economists, beginning with Stigler’s seminal work
on the impact of U.S. enforcement on the number of composition of mergers. George Stigler, The
Economic Effects of the Antitrust Laws, 9 J.L. & ECON. 225 (1966). See also Robin Aaronson, Do
Companies take any Notice of Competition policy?, 2 CONSUMER POLICY REV. 140 (1992); Jo Seldeslachts
et. al., Settle for Now but Block for Tomorrow: The Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy Tools, 52 J. LAW
& ECON. 607 (2009); Joseph A. Clougherty & Jo Seldeslachts, The Deterrence Effects of US Merger Policy
Instruments, __ J. LAW & ECON ORGAN. __ (2012).
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Most recently, there has been consideration of when (if at all) the agencies should use behavioral
remedies instead of divestitures or other structural remedies. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade
Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2010) [hereinafter MERGERS REMEDIES MANUAL],
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/08/100819hmg.pdf. For a recent interesting commentary, see Ken
Heyer, Optimal Remedies for Anticompetitive Mergers, 26 ANTITRUST 26 (2012).
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I elsewhere have concluded that the relevant antitrust standard is true consumer welfare. Steven C.
Salop, Question: What is the Real and Proper Antitrust Welfare Standard? Answer: The True Consumer
Welfare Standard, 22 LOYOLA CONSUMER L. REV. 336 (2010). However, the analysis of settlements in this
article also would apply to other economic welfare standards. The key assumption we are making is that
merger settlements will fall in the range where the settlement will increase welfare and decrease profits.
For further discussion of the proper welfare measure, see Robert H. Lande, Chicago's False Foundation:
Wealth Transfers (Not Just Efficiency) Should Guide Antitrust, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 631 (1989). For a
defense of the total welfare standard, see Ken Heyer, Welfare Standards and Merger Analysis: Why Not the
Best?, 2 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L. 53 (2006). Note also the economics literature that shows that agencies
with an overarching goal of maximizing aggregate welfare nonetheless might commit to use a consumer
welfare standard in merger enforcement when negotiating with the merging parties. These models also
discuss merger policy and deterrence more generally. Joseph Farrell, Negotiation and Merger
Remedies: Some Problems, in Howard Shelanski and Francois Leveque (eds.), MERGER REMEDIES IN
COMPETITION POLICY ___ (2003); David Besanko and Daniel F. Spulber, Contested Mergers and
Equilibrium Antitrust Policy, __ J.L.ECON. ORG. 1 ((1993); Sven-Olof Fridolfsson, A Consumer
Surplus Defense in Merger Control, in ed. by V. Ghosal, and J. Stennek (eds), THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF ANTITRUST, 287 (2007); Damien J. Neven & Lars-Hendrik Röller, Consumer
Surplus vs. Welfare Standard in a Political Economy Model of Merger Control ¸ INT’L J.
INDUSTRIAL ORG. (2005); Joseph Farrell & Michael L. Katz, The Economics of Welfare
Standards in Antitrust , 2 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 2 (2006); Mark Armstrong and John Vickers,
A Model of Delegated Project Choice, ECONOMETRICA 213 (2010).
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Assuming that settlements are made, how strong a settlement should the agencies
demand? Should the agencies refuse any settlement that involves a reduction in welfare,
relative to the no-merger level, even if they face a risk of losing in court? Should the
agencies ever demand settlements that lead to a level of welfare strictly above the nomerger level? Should the agencies negotiate settlements or just make non-negotiable,
take-it-or-leave-it settlement demands? Should the agencies accept 11th hour voluntary
divestiture offers?
This article uses decision theory to formulate “optimal” agency settlement policy
under two alternative assumptions. It first formulates a “short run” optimal policy that
focuses only the specific merger proposal being evaluated and does not take deterrence
into account, it then formulates a “long run” optimal policy that takes into account effects
on future mergers and deterrence goals. 14 It also evaluates the competing claims about
agency behavior in the context of the optimal policies.
The analysis reaches a number of conclusions. The optimal short-run and long
run policies are very different. The short-run optimal policy may lead to some welfarereducing settlements by a rationally gun-shy agency It also may involve exacting tribute
by settlement demands for weakly welfare-enhancing merger proposals. It also may
cause unintended “anti-deterrence,” whereby some merging firms propose mergers with
greater potential welfare harm in order to increase their settlement bargaining leverage.
In contrast, a disciplined long-run optimal policy would clear all welfare-enhancing
mergers as-proposed. It also would forgo negative welfare settlements despite the risk of
losing in court, but instead demand settlements on welfare-reducing merger proposals
14

Long-run optimization also could take into account the impact on legal standards and future judicial
decisions.
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sufficient to lead to overall welfare increases (not just welfare-neutrality), relative to no
merger. It would avoid anti-deterrence by demanding larger settlements for more
harmful mergers. Deterrence also would be improved if last-minute voluntary divestiture
agreements were not treated as part of the merger agreement evaluated by the court,
contrary to the approach taken in Arch Coal and other cases.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section II sets out the basic
analytic framework and the formal model used. To fix the ideas, Section III explains the
proper standard for merger enforcement is welfare-maximization, subject to the
constraints imposed by practicality and deterrence. Section IV analyzes the agency’s
short run optimal settlement commitment strategy when there are non-trivial litigation
costs for the firm and imperfect information by the agency, parties and the court. Section
V analyzes the properties of the optimal long-run deterrence strategy. Section VI
concludes and discusses several possible extensions of this analysis. The Appendix
contains a technical model of the basic issues and the short run optimal policy.

II. Basic Analytic Framework
This article uses decision theory to formulate optimal merger enforcement and
settlement policy under the HSR process in the US and the analogous regulatory process
in other countries. It analyzes two types of agency settlement and enforcement strategies:
(i) a short-run optimal policy, which assumes that the agency evaluates each merger
proposal on its own, without regard to any possible impact of its decision on future
merger proposals and (ii) a long-run optimal policy, which assumes that the agency does
take into account the impact of its decisions on future merger proposals. The long-run
optimal policy differs substantially from the short-run policy. By including long-run

7

deterrence effects into its analysis, the long-run policy better protects consumer welfare.
It also resolves a number of the commentators’ criticisms of current agency policy.
This analysis involves an understanding of the incentives of the agencies and the
merging parties to settle cases rather than litigate. The analysis of settlements incentives
involves an understanding of the costs and benefits of litigation versus settlement for the
agencies and the merging parties. These depend in turn on the impact of the transaction
on welfare and profitability, as well as on imperfect information and litigation costs.
They also depend on expectations of the outcome in court, including the fact that the
courts also suffer from imperfect information. Design of optimal long-run enforcement
policy also involves an understanding of how the agencies’ settlement demands and
settlement negotiations affect deterrence, that is, how they affect the merger proposals
made by the merging firms. Because settlements are negotiated in the shadow of the law,
it also is necessary to link settlement behavior to the legal standards and to the behavior
of courts. 15
A. The Importance of Settlements in Merger Enforcement
It is clear that settlements reached before trial – whether voluntary restructurings
or consent decrees -- are key aspects of the merger review and enforcement process.
Settlements permit mergers to proceed expeditiously and achieve cognizable efficiencies,
while reducing or eliminating market power concerns. 16 In fact, most mergers that raise
competitive concerns settle, rather than go to court. Table 1 provides basic merger U.S.

15

Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88
YALE L. J. 950 (1979).

16

Ken Heyer, supra note 12.
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enforcement outcomes data for 1999-2011. 17 Fewer than 2% of mergers that received
second requests reached an adjudicated judgment.
Of course, these results likely would have been different if the agency settlement
policy and behavior were different. Thus, understanding settlement behavior and
formulating sensible policy is a key component of merger enforcement policy. This
article is a step in that direction.

Table 1
Outcomes of HSR Filings 18
Challenges 19
Year

Reported

2011 20
2010
2009
2008
2007

1,414
1,128
684
1,656
2,108

Second
Challenged
Requests
58
46
31
41
63

Restructured

36
35
29
35
32

Abandoned

4
2
5
7

13 total
7
12
3
7

Adjudicated
Cases Won at
judgment

Consent
Decrees
19
24
15
26
16

Adjudicated
Cases Lost at
judgment
2
0
0
1
0

2
0
0
0
2
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For similar statistics, see Lawrence M. Frankel, The Flawed Institutional Design of U.S. Merger Review,
2008 UTAH L.R. 159, 162-63 (2008) and the references cited therein. See also Jonathan Baker & Carl
Shapiro, Reinvigorating Horizontal Merger Enforcement, in Robert Pitofsky, How the Chicago School
Overshot The Mark, Oxford U. Press (2008); Jonathan B. Baker & Carl Shapiro, Reinvigorated Merger
Enforcement in the Obama Administration, Antitrust & Competition Pol’y Blog (June 25, 2012), available
at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2012/06/reinvigorated-merger-enforcement-in-theobama-administration.html. See also Daniel A. Crane, Has the Obama Justice Department Reinvigorated
Antitrust Enforcement?, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 13, 16 (July 18, 2012); Jonathan B. Baker & Carl
Shapiro, Evaluating Merger Enforcement During the Obama Administration, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 28
(August 21, 2012).
18

Table does not include non-HSR challenges.
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The difference between Restructuring and Consent Decrees is whether the complaint was filed.
Restructuring indicates altering the transaction without the government filing a formal complaint, while a
consent decree outcome entails settlement occurring after either the commencement of litigation or agency
proceedings.
20

For 2011, the FTC stated that its 17 challenges have resulted in 9 consent decrees, 3 judicial proceedings
(Promedica – win; Lab Corp. – loss; Phoebe – loss, appeal to USSC pending), and 5 abandon/restructures.
The five abandon/restructure cases are non-public and cannot be categorized any further. The
Commission’s counterpart, the DOJ, entered into 11 consent decrees, 1 merger was abandoned (AT&T), 1
merger was blocked at trial (H&R Block), and 7 other transactions were restructured. For purposes of
calculating the percentages, all 5 FTC cases were allocated to the abandoned column based on the FTC’s
statistical average from the 1999-2010 period of having an abandoned-to-restructure ratio of 83 to 5.

9

2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001 21
2000
1999

1,746
1,610
1,377
968
1,142
2,237
4,749
4,340

45
50
35
35
49
70
98
111

30
17
24
33
31
55
79
76

6
2
1
3
5
20
16
16

9
4
5
17
12
8
26
23

15
11
15
13
13
26
36
37

0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0

0
0
2
0
1
0
0
0

Total

25,159

732

512

94

139

266

5

7

100.0%

2.9%
70.0%

12.8%

19.0%

36.3%

0.7%

1.0%

% of total
filings
% of
Second
Requests

100.0%

B. Imperfect Information, Litigation Costs and Delay
Merger review takes place in an environment of inherent uncertainty and litigation
costs. Settlements are struck through negotiation, in which bargaining leverage is
important. The key to understanding the bargaining leverage of the two sides involves
several factors: the impact of the merger on welfare and profitability; the relative
litigation and delay costs of the two sides; their information and risk aversion; their
reputational costs and benefits of litigation; and the behavior of the courts. 22
The impact of the consummation of the transaction on welfare and profitability
clearly is a paramount factor. The agencies are tasked with protecting competition and
maximizing welfare. The merging firms are concerned with maximizing shareholder

21

In February 2001, the HSR reporting rules changed, resulting in a substantial reduction in the number of
mergers that required HSR filings.
22

For a dealmaker’s view of negotiation dynamics, see James C. Freund, Smart Negotiating: How to Make
Good Deals in the Real World, Simon & Schuster Publishing (1993). See also Roger Fisher & William L.
Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In, Penguin Books (1981). The economic
analysis of bargaining is based on the Nash Bargaining Solution and Nash sequential bargaining
equilibrium. See John Nash, The Bargaining Problem, 18 ECONOMETRICA 155 (1950); Ken Binmore et.
al., The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling,. 17 RAND J. ECON. 176 (1986).
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value. Another key factor is relative litigation costs. For the merging firms, delay costs
and uncertainty likely are more significant than out-of-pocket litigation costs, except
perhaps for small transactions. 23 Delays raise costs for several reasons. 24 First, litigation
delays the consummation of the transaction, and achievement of the increased value.
Second, delays lead to uncertainty that makes it risky for the merging firms to move
forward with their business plans and strategies during the interim until the matter is
resolved. This may not be primarily an issue of risk aversion, but rather a matter of not
wanting to waste investments. In addition, delays can lead to the loss of key managers of
the acquired firm, who do not know if they will be retained after the merger.
Finally, and perhaps most important, there are serious failure risks from delays.
Delays increase the likelihood that the merger will fail to be consummated at all, even
aside from the legal risks. It is commonly said that “time is enemy of the deal” and the
situation is no different for merger transactions. During the period of delay, market
conditions and strategies may change, so that the merger may no longer be the interest of
one of the parties, or might create the potential for opportunism. Because delays put the
entire value of the transaction at risk, they provide strong incentives to settle quickly.
If the merging firms’ litigation and delay costs are large, the agency would gain a
significant bargaining advantage. It could anticipate that its settlement demand is more

23

For large matters, out-of-pocket costs probably will be small, relative to the incremental value of the
merger. That incremental value is equal to the net present value of future profits less the cost of the
acquisition.
24

The magnitude of these delay costs is more likely to be a proportion of the incremental value of the
merger, rather than being a fixed cost that does not vary with the size of the transaction.
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likely to be accepted by the merging firms to avoid further delays. 25 This anticipation
might lead the agency to demand a more intrusive settlement.
The agencies also may have litigation costs. First, the agencies have limited
budgets, which could create opportunity costs. However, it is not clear how significant
these opportunity costs are. Budgets are sufficient for litigation on the current scale and
likely would be increased if litigation intensity increased over time. The agencies also
may have negative opportunity costs in that litigation experience provides valuable staff
training and beneficial credentials. However, the agencies likely do face significant
capacity constraints during limited periods of merger booms or when an an
administration wants to quickly ramp up litigation intensity. 26
The agencies also are sensitive to their win/loss records in court. The agencies
appear concerned that critics will interpret losses in court to agency over-reaching, bad
judgment or incompetence. The agencies also may want to avoid losses to maintain staff
morale. There also could be possible adverse deterrence effects from losses in court. A
loss in court could change the law and thereby alter the agency’s future litigation
prospects. All of these factors create “opportunity costs” for the agencies that could
make them “gun shy” about bringing cases instead of reaching a settlement, even if the
settlement leads to a welfare-reduction. 27 As discussed below, these concerns arguably
are overstated, if not entirely misfounded. 28

25

McFalls and Sims, supra note 6, focus on the agencies’ ability to inflict delay costs on the firm as the
primary reason for the agencies’ bargaining leverage.

26

For example, comparing the merger wave of 2000 to the more modest merger activity in 2011, the
second request rate was about 2% in 2000 versus 4% in 2011. There also were more transactions
adjudicated in 2011.

27

For example, the DOJ’s loss in the Oracle merger litigation has been said to have led to its scaling back
its enforcement of unilateral effects. Baker & Shapiro, supra note 3, at 32-33; James A. Keyte, United
States v. H&R Block: The DOJ Invokes Brown Shoe to Shed the Oracle Albatross, ANTITRUST, Spring
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C. The Determinants of Settlement Behavior
Imperfect information is central to this analysis. We assume that all three
participants (the agency, the firms and the court) face imperfect information about
welfare. We assume that the agency can accurately estimate the expected welfare impact,
in the sense of having unbiased estimates. However, those estimates involve some
unavoidable uncertainty regarding the ultimate actual welfare impact. For example, even
if the estimate of expected welfare impact is positive, it is possible that the merger
actually could cause welfare to fall, or vice versa. 29
In the U.S., the enforcement agencies do not have carte blanche to order
divestitures or other changes to the structure of the merger. Instead, settlements are
negotiated in the shadow of the legal standards for liability under Section 7 of the
Clayton Act. A court will reject a proposed merger if and only if it concludes that the
expectation is that merger will be welfare-reducing, relative to the no-merger
alternative. 30

2012, at 32, 32 (“[T]he desire for a litigated win in the shadow of Oracle had become palpable in the
hallways of the Antitrust Division.”); Scott A. Sher & Andrea Agathoklis Murino, Unilateral Effects in
Technology Markets: Oracle, H&R Block, and What It All Means, ANTITRUST, Summer 2012, at 46, 46
(“[T]he DOJ’s recent victory in H&R Block has reinvigorated a mode of unilateral effects analysis that had
been seriously undermined when the DOJ lost the Oracle case.”) (footnotes omitted).
28

Section V.B.

29

For example, the agency may expect that the merger either will reduce welfare by 100 or raise it by 40,
each with probability of 50%, in which case the expected welfare impact is a welfare reduction of 30 (i.e.,
50% x (-100) + 50% x (+40) = -30).
30

This raises the issue of whether a court should evaluate the merger relative to an attainable maximum
welfare standard rather than no-merger alternative, as discussed in more detail below. We also will discuss
the scenario in which the firm is able to restructure the merger in the face of litigation, in which case the
court may evaluate the restructured merger, not the merger as-proposed.
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We assume that the court has no information that the agency lacks. 31 For
simplicity, we also assume that the parties and the agency agree about the welfare impact
of the settlement. 32 We assume that the court is less informed and less expert than the
agency. We will assume that the court has made an erroneous finding (false acquittal), if
and when it rules against an agency that challenges a merger that the agency it believes
will reduce welfare. 33 However, we will assume that the court’s decisions are not
perverse. That is, we assume that the court is less likely to falsely convict if the welfare
benefits are larger, and the court is less likely to falsely acquit if the welfare harms are
larger.
In order to estimate the likelihood that its settlement demand will be accepted by
the merging firms, the agency must estimate the firms’ incremental profitability of the
merger and their litigation and delay costs, including delay risks. The firms would have
the incentive to accept a settlement demand that would lead to profits that exceed their
expected profits from litigating. If the agency had perfect information about profitability,
it could tailor a maximal settlement demand that the merging firms surely would accept.
In this way, the agency also could avoid transactions being abandoned as result of
31

In the real world, additional information sometimes is developed in preparation for trial that would
change the estimate of the expected welfare. This possibility is ignored in the analysis here, but could be
added.
32

In the real world, the merging firms likely face imperfect information about the agency’s estimate of the
incremental welfare impact of the merger as-proposed, as well as the agency’s estimate of the welfare
impact of various alternative structures that might be offered as settlements. This imperfect information
might involve the agency’s analysis of the cognizability of the claimed efficiencies, as well as market
power factors. The firms also might have imperfect information about the agency’s opportunity costs. In
the scenario in which the agency makes a non-negotiable settlement demand, the results would not change
whether or not the firms have perfectly information about the agency’s expected welfare estimate. This is
because the firms simply respond to the agency’s demand. However, in situations where the firms propose
a settlement, they likely can do no better than assigning a probability that the agency will accept its
settlement offer rather than litigate.
33
Similarly, if (as we will explain) the agency challenges a merger that it believes will increase welfare
and the court agrees to enjoin the merger, then that outcome also will be treated as erroneous (false
conviction).
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overreaching settlement demands, as well as avoid unnecessary litigation. However, we
assume that the agency generally has imperfect information about the firms’ profitability,
including their perceived cost and risk of delay.
For much of our analysis, we assume that the agency makes a non-negotiable,
“take it or leave it” (“tioli”) settlement demands, backed up by a commitment to litigate
if its demand is rejected by the firms. 34 We assume that these demands are made after the
agency has reached its conclusion about the welfare impact of the merger, based on its
own completed investigation, analysis by the parties and discussions between the agency
and the parties.
Bargaining theory often assumes that negotiators are not able to make credible
tioli offers. However, in the case of merger enforcement, the agency has inherent
bargaining advantages that make reputation formation and commitments more possible.
Enforcement decisions are made repeatedly by the agencies with respect to numerous
mergers and those decisions are accompanied by explanations. 35 The agencies also can
reinforce their reputational effects and make their threats more credible though
guidelines, press releases and speeches.
This assumption that the agency makes non-negotiable settlement demands
clearly does not describe current agency behavior. The normal procedure is for the
agency and merging parties to negotiate over the details of a possible settlement, not
34

Of course, firms have potential bargaining counterstrategies to mitigate or even reverse the agency’s
inherent bargaining leverage. One strategy is an last-minute divestiture proposal, as discussed in Section
V.E. Firms also can signal a greater (and more credible) willingness to litigate in various way, such as by
agreeing to a duty to litigate or paying a large reverse breakup fee in the acquisition agreement, by
preparing their trial strategy and exhibits in advance, or by retaining a law firm with a reputation and taste
for litigating. For an interesting database on reverse termination fees, see Dale Collins, Antitrust Reverse
Termination Fees, (July 15, 2011), available at
http://www.antitrustunpacked.com/siteFiles/BlogPosts/005_reverse_breakup_fees1.pdf.
35

A few merging parties are repeat players and they have a similar ability to establish reputations.
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simply to make threats. Negotiations are used to exchange relevant information about the
potential agreement, explore common ground and learn the consequences of failure to
reach agreement. 36

These informational benefits may mitigate or even trump the

bargaining power benefits to the agency of committing to making only a single nonnegotiable offer.

However, the assumption that the agency makes non-negotiable

settlement demands is a useful starting point for our normative analysis of optimal
enforcement policy.
III. The Welfare-Maximization Standard and Optimal Deterrence
To explicate these concepts, we initially assume that there are no information
imperfections or litigation costs. We assume instead that the agency and the merging
parties both know (and agree on) the welfare impact and profitability of the merger and
possible settlements. We also assume that the court never errs. Within this simple
structure, we analyze the agency’s settlement commitment strategy and the impact of the
strategy on the behavior of merging firms. This simple scenario also can be used to
explain the benefits of a settlement standard geared towards maximum welfare, not
welfare-neutrality
The overarching goal of the antitrust laws is to maximize welfare. We consider
how this goal should play out for an agency choosing its settlement policy for potentially
anticompetitive mergers. We assume that the agency makes a non-negotiable settlement
demand. If the firms reject the settlement demand, the matter goes to litigation, and the
court decides whether or not to block the merger, based on the incremental welfare
impact of the merger as proposed. Because the court also has perfect information, it

36

See, e.g., Schelling, supra note 22; Freund, supra note 22; Fisher & Ury, supra note 22.
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enjoins the merger if and only if the merger reduces welfare. That is, the court uses a
legal standard of welfare-neutrality.
A. The Agency’s Welfare-Maximizing Optimal Settlement Demand
Suppose that there is perfect information and zero litigation costs for all sides. In
this scenario, the agency’s optimal strategy is simple. If the merger as-proposed is be
welfare-enhancing, the agency will clear the merger as-proposed. If the matter were
litigated in court, the judge would correctly find that the merger is welfare-enhancing and
would reject the agency’s complaint with certainty. This fact is known by the firms, so
any settlement demand would be rejected by the firms, which lack litigation and delay
costs.
In contrast, if the merger were welfare-reducing, the agency would have complete
control. The court would enjoin the merger with certainty, if the matter were litigated. In
this situation, the merging firms would accept any settlement demand for which its
incremental profits would remain positive. Thus, the agency would have the ability and
incentive to make the settlement demand that maximizes welfare, subject only to the
constraint that the firms would rather accept the settlement than abandon the transaction.
B. The Proper Welfare Benchmark for Merger Enforcement
This agency ability and incentive to demand the welfare-maximizing divestiture
raises the policy issue of whether maximum welfare should be the agency’s goal in
settlements. The liability standard is that a merger is illegal where “the effect of such an
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition.” 37 It might be argued that this
implies that the agency should limit settlement demands solely to prevent the mergers

37

§7 Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §18
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from reducing welfare, and should demand settlements that lead to strictly positive
incremental welfare impacts, let alone welfare-maximization. 38
This argument for welfare-neutrality misses the mark for several reasons. First,
the Section 7 legal standard applies to judicial decision-making, not to settlements.
Settlements are voluntary agreements that are made to avoid litigation, and are not
subject to the same standard as for liability. 39 In fact, as discussed below, when there is
imperfect information and agency litigation costs, the agency often will find it optimal to
accept some settlements that lead to welfare-reductions to compensate for litigation
risks. 40
Second, even as a legal matter, the relevant standard is not welfare-neutrality of
the overall merger as-proposed. The issue is more complicated. The proper standard is
welfare maximization, subject to constraints of practicality and deterrence. Firms
would not be incentivized to opt for the most efficient and procompetitive merger
proposals, if the competitive effects analysis were judged solely on the overall impact of
the merger proposal as a whole,. Their incentives predictably would lead to lower
welfare and might be called “anti-deterrence.” 41 Thus, agencies and courts should
analyze whether multiple aspects of the merger are inextricably linked and reasonably
necessary to achieve the welfare goals of the transaction. If they are not inextricably
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Sims and McFalls, supra note 6.

39

For example, see Joseph G. Krauss et. al., The Tunney Act: A House Still Standing, The Antitrust Source,
(June 2007), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/Jun07_
Krauss6_20f.authcheckdam.pdf. For a critical view, see John J. Flynn & Darren Bush, The Misuse and
Abuse of the Tunney Act: The Adverse Consequences of the “Microsoft Fallacies,” 34 LOYOLA CONSUMER
L.R. 749 (2003).
40

See Section IV.

41

Anti-deterrence is discussed in more detail in Section IV.
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linked, they should be evaluated separately. This procedure that is consistent with a
standard of welfare-maximization, not welfare-neutrality.
This policy analysis can be illustrated by the example a firm that carries out a
series of acquisitions over time. For example, suppose that one supermarket chain in Los
Angeles first proposes to acquire one of the two Los Angeles supermarket chains owned
a significant competitor. Suppose that this acquisition of the one chain would be
considered clearly procompetitive and welfare enhancing, and would be cleared by the
agency. Suppose, however, that the buyer subsequently proposes to acquire the seller’s
second chain three months later. Suppose that the agency concludes that this second
merger clearly would be anticompetitive and welfare-reducing. Thus, the agency would
challenge this second merger. These results are not controversial.
As a benchmark for comparison, consider the following alternative timing.
Suppose instead that the buyer had proposed to acquire both chains simultaneously.
Assume further that the agency concludes after its analysis that while both acquisitions
considered jointly (on an all-or-nothing basis) would raise welfare slightly, the welfare
enhancement actually comes solely from the acquisition of the first chain. That is, the
acquisition of the second chain reduces welfare (as in the first example), by slightly less
than the acquisition of the first chain raises welfare. If the two acquisitions were
inextricably linked in some way, it would make sense to analyze the acquisitions as a
single unit. But, in the hypothetical example, suppose that agency concludes that the
welfare benefits from the first acquisition are not inextricably linked to the second
acquisition. That is, suppose that the agency further concludes that, if the two
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acquisitions had been attempted sequentially, the second acquisition would have been
challenged as anticompetitive, just as in the previous scenario.
In this hypothetical, the agency either should not permit the acquisition of the
second chain. 42 The merger-specific efficiencies are not inextricably linked to the
acquisition of the second chain. This merger (absent the divestiture) also could be
considered a violation of Section 7. The acquisition of the smaller chain has the effect of
substantially lessening competition. 43
These examples show that if competitive effects are evaluated solely on the
overall impact, it could incentivize merging firms to their broaden procompetitive merger
proposals to include anticompetitive elements. This might involve expanding the set of
assets acquired. It also might involve including (or even adding) anticompetitive
provisions. This is a harmful incentive that predictably would lead to lower welfare.
Thus, if merger law is concerned at all with deterrence, it must condemn this conduct.
This implies that the legal standard is welfare-maximization, not simply welfareneutrality of the overall merger proposal. Only if the multiple elements of the merger
are inextricably linked, as explained in the Merger Guidelines, should they be evaluated
as unitary. 44
This focus on welfare-maximization does have two important limits. This
analysis does not give the agencies carte blanche to engage in subtle restructuring of
42

Or, if the seller insisted on selling both chains, the agency should require the divestiture of the second
chain.
43

This analysis easily can be placed into the context of Section 1. The acquisition of the second chain’s
assets (and the resulting incremental reduction in welfare) is not reasonably necessary for the success of the
merger as a whole.
44
U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2010) [hereinafter, “2010
Merger Guidelines” or “Guidelines”], available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg2010.pdf. 2010 Merger Guidelines at n.14.
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procompetitive mergers in order to gain small increases in welfare. First, a small
welfare-enhancing divestiture may not be practical. A small divestiture might not raise
welfare while a large divestiture may lead to litigation in a world with imperfect
information. Second, as discussed below, a policy of exacting tribute from mergers that
are welfare-enhancing as-proposed actually may reduce deterrence by lessening the
incentives of merging firms to forgo welfare-reducing proposals in favor of welfareenhancing ones. 45
C. Merger Selection, Restructuring and Deterrence Effects
The analysis of the short-run optimal policy assumes that agency and the merging
firms take the structure of the proposed merger as fixed. The merging firm responds to
the agency’s settlement demand by settling, litigating or abandoning the transaction.
However, in the real world, the firms might voluntarily restructure the merger, even
before proposing it to the agency. Restructuring can benefit the firms by altering the
agency’s demand.
Such restructuring incentives are straightforward to analyze when there is perfect
information and de minimis litigation and delay costs, and when the agency demands the
welfare-maximizing settlement for all welfare-reducing mergers while clearing asproposed welfare-neutral and welfare-enhancing mergers. Suppose that an acquiring firm
is contemplating a welfare-reducing merger proposal. Anticipating the agency’s
settlement demand, it would be in the interest of the firm voluntarily to restructure the
merger proposal to the welfare-neutral level. Although this structure would reduce its
profits relative to the original merger as-proposed, it likely would lead to higher profits
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Section V.B, supra.
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than if the agency forced the firms to make the welfare-maximizing divestiture. The
same result could occur if the acquiring firm has a choice to select one of several
potential merger partners.
Although the agency is following a short-run policy without regard to deterrence,
its policy nonetheless has a deterrence effect. 46 Deterrence is an important goal of
merger enforcement. Agency settlement policy must treat deterrence as a central goal.
IV. Imperfect Information, Litigation Costs and the Agency’s Short-Run Optimal
Settlement Commitment Strategy
Agency settlement behavior depends on whether the agency focuses solely on the
merger under consideration or whether it takes deterrence effects into account. The
section analyzes the optimal policy when deterrence is not the focus. The analysis of this
short-run optimal policy is complex when the parties have imperfect information and
significant litigation costs. The predicted results resemble the outcomes discussed – and
criticized – by commentators.
A. Basic Analytics
The analysis can be explained most simply by distinguishing among mergers that
have different welfare impacts as-proposed. Much of the analysis in this section is based
on the technical model contained in the Appendix.
1. Welfare-Reducing Mergers
Consider a merger that is expected to be welfare-reducing as-proposed. The
agency would choose the settlement demand that optimally balances the risks and
rewards of being more or less aggressive. On the one hand, the reward from being more
aggressive is that welfare will be higher, if the settlement demand is accepted. On the
46
On closer analysis, however, the voluntary restructuring ironically is harmful to welfare. As a result of
this voluntary restructuring, the agency then loses the opportunity to force the firm to settle for the welfaremaximizing structure.
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other hand, the risk is that the merging firms are less likely to accept a tougher demand.
And, if the firms reject the demand, the agency may lose in court, in which case
consumers will suffer the welfare reduction from the merger as-proposed.
For this reason, it may be optimal for the agency to propose a settlement that
nonetheless would lead to welfare harm, even if the agency litigation costs are zero. The
explanation for this striking result is the agency’s fear of the court reaching a false
acquittal result and permitting the merger as-proposed. In deciding whether to
accommodate a welfare-reducing settlement, the agency would recognize that a false
acquittal would lead to even greater welfare harm than would an accommodative
settlement.
This analysis also shows how a greater potential for judicial errors affects
settlements. The larger is the probability of a false acquittal, the more likely the agency
would have the incentive to weaken its settlement demand. Indeed, even if the likelihood
of a false negative falls far short of 50%, the agency still might be so fearful that the
firms would reject the settlement and the agency will lose in in court that it would accept
a significantly welfare-reducing settlement. 47
In fact, a merger with larger welfare harm as-proposed sometimes can lead the
agency to demand an even weaker welfare-reducing settlement. This can occur if the
likelihood of a false acquittal for the more harmful merger proposal nonetheless remains
significant. In particular, when the expected harm from a merger as-proposed is higher
(that is, when the decrease in the likelihood that the firms would win in court is more than

47

The agency also would be more willing to be satisfied with a negative welfare settlement when a
welfare-neutral settlement demand would lead to a substantial reduction in the likelihood that the firms
would accept the settlement. In that situation, it might make sense for the agency to settle for a smaller
welfare reduction, rather than take on the litigation risk of a false acquittal outcome.
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offset by a larger potential welfare harm from the more problematical merger), then the
agency has more to lose from going to court. This is a very significant result because it
suggests that firms may do better by proposing more problematical mergers, what might
be called “anti-deterrence.”
There are limits to this effect. One might expect that the likelihood of a false
acquittal would become very low for very egregiously anticompetitive mergers, leading
to a lower expected welfare harm. But, while this might be true in the extreme, the
agency cannot simply assume that the probability of a false negative approaches zero,
even for substantially anticompetitive transactions. The defense could win on a
procedural technicality; the agency’s lawyers may be outgunned in court by a wellfinanced and skillful adversary; the agency’s key witness might blow up on the stand; or,
perhaps an inexperienced, careless or ideologically blinded district court judge will
totally miss out on the merits. 48
In contrast, there are two situations where an agency focused only on the shortrun clearly would find it optimal to insist on a welfare-enhancing settlement. One
situation is a case in which both the agency and the firms perceive the agency’s chances
of winning in court is very high. In that situation, the firms likely would be willing to
agree to a welfare-enhancing settlement and the agency would have the incentive to take
the (small) risk that the firms would choose to litigate. The other situation involves an
agency expectation that risk/reward ratio is low, that is, where the agency perceives that a
more aggressive settlement demand would not significantly reduce the firms’ willingness

48

For example, in Whole Foods, the judge apparently overlooked statements by the CEO that one effect of
the merger would be to eliminate the possibility of future price wars. FTC v. Whole Foods, 502 F.Supp.2d
1 (D.D.C. 2007). In Lundbeck, the judge made an inexplicable market definition error. FTC v. Lundbeck,
2010-2 Trade Cases (CCH) ¶ 77,160 (D. Minn. 2010), affirmed, 650 F.3d 1236 (8th Cir. 2011).
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to settle. In that case, the more aggressive settlement demand would have only a very
small downside risk. As a result, it would make sense for the agency to push the
envelope.
2. Welfare-Neutral and Welfare-Enhancing Mergers
Consider next a welfare-neutral merger proposal. Putting aside agency litigation
costs, it always would be optimal for the agency to demand a welfare-improving
settlement rather than clear the merger as-proposed. The firms almost surely would
accept a modest settlement. But even if there is some chance that a more aggressive
demand would lead to litigation and potential loss in court, the agency would lose
nothing.
Consider next a merger that is expected to be welfare-enhancing as-proposed.
The agency nonetheless may demand a settlement that would increase welfare rather than
a divestiture rather than permit the merger as-proposed. The merger as-proposed does
not maximize welfare, so there is room for a welfare improvement by a more aggressive
stance. 49 As long as the firms have some fear of losing in court or some litigation or
delay costs, they would have the incentive to make some concessions. This situation
illustrates a bargaining advantage that the agency has in settlement negotiations.
The agency’s short-run optimal settlement demand would be simple if it knew the
firms’ profit function, litigation and delay costs. The agency could demand the
maximum settlement offer that the firm would accept. However, with imperfect
information, demanding a more aggressive settlement is a risky and somewhat ironic
agency strategy. On the one hand, if the firms accept the settlement, welfare will
49

This assumes, of course, that the efficiencies would not be lost. Where the efficiencies are inextricably
linked to the divested assets, consumer welfare benefits could be lost.
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improve. On the other hand, if the firms reject the settlement and the agency wins in
court (as a result of a false acquittal), welfare will be lower than if the merger were
cleared as-proposed. Thus, if the firms reject the settlement demand, the agency actually
would have the short-run incentive to abandon the litigation. 50
For this reason, when the agency decides to demand a settlement for a welfareenhancing merger as-proposed, it must do so judiciously. First, the agency should only
take this aggressive approach when the merger as-proposed is not substantially better
than welfare-neutral. In that situation, the agency has less to lose if the firms reject the
settlement and the agency wins in court. Second, the agency should reserve such an
aggressive strategy for situations where the firms’ litigation and delay costs appear high.
In that way, the probability is lower that the settlement will be rejected. Third, the
agency should not be greedy. It should not demand such a large divestiture that it
becomes unlikely that the firms will accept the settlement.
There are several economic reasons why such an aggressive policy might not
optimal for the agency, even if the agency ignores deterrence effects. First, the agency
may be less intent on extracting small settlements because such settlements may not
actually increase welfare. For example, a divestiture that is too small may not create a
significant competitor necessary to increase expected welfare. 51 Second, the agencies
conceivably may feel that extracting such tribute is irresponsible behavior that involves
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One possible option would be for the agency to assign its less talented litigators to the case as a way to
reduce its likelihood of winning in court. Of course, given the importance of the agency maintaining its
commitments, in order to incentivize future firms to accept such settlements, abandoning the suit or
throwing the game would not be a wise move in the long term.
51

See Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Competition, A Study of the Commission’s Divestiture
Process (1999), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/08/divestiture.pdf.
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the abuse of governmental power. 52 Or, perhaps staff morale would be reduced by
litigating such cases. Third, the agencies may fear that the firms will litigate out of
anger, despite the cost of doing so. 53 Finally, and perhaps most important, extracting
tribute can be an impediment to effective deterrence, as discussed below in Section V.
B. The Role of Judicial Error
A higher likelihood of judicial errors will impact the agency’s optimal settlement
demand. If the likelihood of false acquittals is higher, the agency must be more
accommodative in its settlement demands in welfare-reducing mergers. This is an
unsurprising result. Perhaps more surprisingly, if the likelihood of false convictions is
higher, the agency also should be less aggressive in its settlement demands in welfareenhancing mergers. This is an implication of the result that welfare is higher when the
agency loses a welfare-enhancing litigated case than when it wins.
C. Deterrence Impacts
As discussed earlier for the case of perfect information, there are deterrence
effects, even if the agency does not design its policies with deterrence in mind. The
deterrence effects can involve the selection of a merger partner or the structure of the
merger proposed. These results also occur when there is imperfect information and
litigation costs. These deterrence effects can be counterintuitive.
1. Beneficial Deterrence
52

Every practitioner can provide examples of situations where the agency allegedly has extracted tribute.
For example, the FCC required Sirius/XM to increase religious programming as a merger condition. In
defense of the FCC, its statute includes a “public interest” prong, not just competition.
53

Although this is an explanation grounded in practical reality and behavioral economics, rather than
purely rational decision-making, it is common for bargaining to go awry when one side appears
unreasonable. Freund, supra note 41, at 143-47. This is a common result in the Ultimatum Game. See
Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Ultimatum Game, 2 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 195 (1988); Ernst Fehr &
Simon Gächter, Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 980
(2000).
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Consider a welfare-reducing merger proposal. It might be in the acquiring firm’s
interest to choose a less problematical merger partner or restructure the terms of the
merger in a more accommodative way before being confronted by the agency. 54 Even if
the agency does not demand a strict welfare-enhancing proposal, a somewhat less
harmful structure could increase the likelihood of a false acquittal. This higher
probability of a false acquittal would increase the incentives of the firm to reject an
aggressive settlement demand and raise agency concerns about losing in court. Both
effects would serve to deter the agency from making a more aggressive settlement
demand. As a result, the firms may end up with higher profits. This deterrence is
beneficial in the sense that the proposed structure is less welfare-reducing. 55
2. Anti-Deterrence
With imperfect information and litigation costs, the result could reduce deterrence
or create “anti-deterrence.” That is, the firms may find it more profitable to propose a
more problematical merger or structure their merger in a more welfare-reducing way, in
an attempt to frighten the agency into accepting a weaker settlement.
Normally, a larger welfare-reducing merger proposal would decrease the
likelihood of a false acquittal and thereby would embolden the agency to demand an even
stronger settlement. But, where there is a significant likelihood of a false acquittal that is
not highly affected by the merger structure, the opposite result can occur. The fear of a
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Restructuring might be done as part of a prepackaged voluntary divestiture or other agreements made at
the time of the initial HSR filing. Or, it might be formulated during the investigation process. As long as a
court will evaluate the impact of a restructured transaction, not the original structure, this type of
restructuring would place the firms in a better position to resist aggressive settlement demands by the
agency. For further discussion, see Section V.E.
55
Of course, the existence of deterrence effects does not mean that there is optimal deterrence. That
deterrence would require additional information about the distribution of potential mergers. Analyzing this
issue is beyond the scope of this article. This required data also would be difficult to collect.
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larger welfare reduction, in the event the settlement is rejected and the court falsely
acquits, will serve to “up the ante” for the agency and may lead it to propose a weaker
settlement. As a result the profits of the merging firms may rise. 56
Merging firms would never say publicly that they are taking a more aggressive
approach to create an in terrorem effect on the agencies. But this type of conduct
sometimes appears to occur. More importantly, this result suggests the importance of the
agency designing a long-run optimal merger settlement policy that takes deterrence
effects into account.
V. Long-Run Optimal Policies for Effective Deterrence
Deterrence of anticompetitive conduct is an important goal of antitrust law and
merger enforcement. Courts and commentators often phrase this issue in terms of
minimizing the frequency and cost of “false positives” and “false negatives.” These terms
are sometimes treated as if they solely involve erroneous convictions and acquittals made
by courts, given the legal standard. But, the terms also implicate deterrence in the
setting of legal standards. 57 Instead, a better interpretation of the term “false positives”
would include “over-deterrence.”
The previous analysis of the short-run optimal policy assumed that the agencies
determined its settlement demand for each merger on its own, without reference to the
impact of its decisions on future mergers. Those decisions nonetheless would have such
56

For example, as noted earlier, suppose that the court may erroneously define the market so broadly that
the combined market share of the merging firms will be in the safe harbor with or without a divestiture.
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For example, see Montsano Co. v Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984) (“deter or penalize
perfectly legitimate conduct”). See also Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 594 (1986) (“chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect”). Indeed, if the only
goal involved setting a legal standard that would minimize errors, without any regard to the unintended
deterrence of beneficial or harmful conduct, one optimal standard would be per se illegality, backed up by
huge sanctions. With that standard, no one would ever violate the law, so there would be no trials and,
therefore, no erroneous convictions or acquittals.
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beneficial or adverse deterrence effects. A long-term optimal strategy would attempt to
deter anticompetitive mergers while encouraging procompetitive ones, as well as
preventing anticompetitive mergers and permitting procompetitive ones.
Formulating a settlement policy to achieve optimal deterrence is not a trivial
undertaking when the parties have imperfect information and litigation costs. 58 However,
further analysis can describe some of the key principles of such a policy. The analysis
also suggests several useful rules of thumb.
A. Tailoring Settlement Demands to Increase Deterrence
Deterrence functions by impacting the incentives of the merging firms. The
general way to achieve deterrence is to formulate a policy that leads firms to have higher
expected returns from welfare-enhancing merger proposals than for welfare-reducing
proposals. The agencies have two basic policy instruments, issuing complaints and
demanding settlements. 59 Issuing complaints is a costly approach and it is imperfect in
light of the judicial false acquittal problem.
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Building a formal optimal control model to derive the optimal long-run settlement policy for a
distribution of merger proposals and firm restructuring decisions in response to the policy is beyond the
scope of this article. Instead, this article will discuss several rules of thumb for approaching optimality.
There is an economic literature involving formal models of merger enforcement policy for optimal
deterrence. For example, the recent article by Nocke and Whinston has the result that for all but the
smallest acquirer, the agency only should approve mergers that increase welfare surplus by an amount that
exceeds a strictly positive minimal acceptable level. Volker Nocke, and Michael.D. Whinston, Merger
Policy with Merger Choice, CSIO Working Paper (December 2010), available at
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/searlecenter/papers/NockeWhinston_MergerChoic.pdf. In contrast, their
earlier article concludes that dynamic optimality is achieved if the agency follow a simple myopic merger
policy of approving all mergers increase consumer welfare. Volker Nocke, and Michael.D. Whinston,
Dynamic Merger Review, NBER working paper No. w14526, Northwestern University (2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1312621&http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstr
act_id=1312621. These models do not include either settlements or litigation risk. See also the articles
cited in note __ supra.
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The agencies could achieve more deterrence if it had the ability directly to levy high fees on welfarereducing mergers. However, the only way it can “tax” is to issue complaints or demand settlements.
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The agencies can use settlement demands to improve deterrence. 60 This would
involve demanding aggressive settlements for welfare-reducing merger proposals while
clearing welfare-enhancing mergers. This policy would increase the benefits at the
margin to the firms from making more procompetitive merger proposals. Thus, the
firms’ incentives to propose or restructure welfare-reducing mergers would be increased.
This result follows from the basic economics of optimal deterrence. Suppose that
the incidence of false convictions and false acquittals means that the likelihood of being
convicted and penalized does not increase very much when an individual actually violates
the legal standard, compared to when the individual actually satisfies the standard. In this
scenario, the incentives to satisfy the standard are reduced, relative to the case in which
there are no errors. 61 The analysis is somewhat more complicated when the individual
can control behavior at the margin with (marginally) more or less “aggressive” behavior
(i.e., choosing whether or not to step closer to or just over the line separating legal from
illegal behavior). If the choice of behavior at the margin does not have much effect on
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We assume that the optimal strategy is to make non-negotiable settlement demands. There are certain
benefits to adopting a negotiation strategy instead, as noted elsewhere. Subsequent work can examine this
assumption in more detail.
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Richard Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STANFORD L. REV. 1477 (1999).
For a simple technical example, see Henrik Lando, Does Wrongful Conviction Lower Deterrence, 35 J.
LEGAL STUD. 327, 329-30 (2006). Lando’s example assumes that the probability of a false acquittal is Pa,
the probability of a false conviction is Pc and the sanction is a fine of F. In that case, the expected sanction
when the individual violates violating the rule is (1-Pa)F, while the expected sanction when the individual
satisfies the rule is PcF. The incentive to satisfy the rule depends on the difference in expected sanctions
(1-Pa-Pc)F. This expression shows that false convictions as well as false acquittals reduce the incentives
to comply with the rule. The intuition of this reasoning can be illustrated with an extreme example.
Suppose that the police randomly stop and ticket for speeding randomly, rather than according to the
driver’s speed. In this scenario, there is no incentive to slow down because Pa=Pc=1/2. A driver might as
well exceed the speed limit and reach the destination more quickly. Lando also discusses the certain
limitations to this under-deterrence result.

31

the probability and likelihood of being detected and convicted, and the resulting expected
sanction, there is less incentive to stay within the legal line. 62
The likelihood of false acquittals in this analysis complicates the optimal policy
because it weakens the relationship between the behavior and the likelihood of being
penalized. However, this weakening effect can be mitigated by increasing penalties. For
example, this is one role of treble damages in antitrust. 63
This deterrence analysis also can be applied to settlements. While the exact shape
of the optimal settlement and enforcement policy is impossible to describe algebraically,
and would depend on the underlying distribution of merger proposals and effects, this
analysis suggests three simple rules of thumb to improve deterrence.

By following these

three rules of thumb, the agencies would give merging firms an increased incentive to
propose welfare-enhancing mergers and restructure welfare-reducing mergers voluntarily.
Anti-deterrence effects also would be greatly reduced. The three rules of thumb can be
summarized as follows:
•

The agencies should commit to clear all mergers that are welfare-enhancing asproposed, even if it would be possible to extract a beneficial settlement.

•

The agencies should commit never to accept welfare-reducing settlements, even if
there is risk of a false acquittal.
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John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards,
70 VA. L. R. 965 (1984). In contrast, even if the likelihood of detection and conviction (and so the expected
sanction) is low, a large increase in the likelihood of detection and conviction for marginally more
aggressive behavior around the legal line will tend to lead to substantial deterrence, perhaps even overdeterrence. An individual has no incentive to significantly increase the odds of being convicted and fined
to gain only a very small private benefit from approaching the legal line.
63

Treble damages often are justified on the grounds that the illegal conduct (e.g., covert price fixing
conspiracies) is often undetected. However, the same analysis would apply to any reason why illegal
behavior would not be penalized, including erroneous acquittals. In fact, this analysis implies the ironic
result that punitive damages make more sense for the “difficult” cases, where errors are more likely, in
contrast to “egregious” cases that are easy to detect and lead to certain conviction. A. Mitchell Polinsky
and Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 868, 891 (1998); Salop
& White, supra note 46.
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•

The agencies should commit always to demand settlements for welfare-reducing
merger proposals that lead to significant welfare increases, not simply welfareneutrality.
These rules of thumb follow directly from the basic deterrence analysis. By

forgoing tribute settlements for welfare-enhancing proposals, while demanding strong
settlements (i.e., settlements that go beyond the welfare-neutral outcome) for welfarereducing proposals, the policy increases the disincentive for the firms to make mergerreducing proposals. This additional wedge is needed because of the adverse effects on
deterrence of false acquittals by the courts. This policy notably rejects the view that the
agency should only attempt to achieve welfare-neutrality. Demanding only welfareneutral settlements would lead to under-deterrence. At the same time, the agency should
not demand settlements for mergers that are welfare-enhancing as-proposed, even if the
merging firms would accept such settlements because of litigation costs and delay risks. 64
Determining the exact magnitude of the required welfare increase for settlements
of welfare-reducing merger proposals requires further analysis, though it is clear that
welfare-neutrality is too accommodative a standard. And, it is also clear that more
harmful merger proposals demand more beneficial settlements. This standard is
necessary to maintain the incentives of potential merging firms to select less harmful
merger proposals or voluntarily restructure their proposals in beneficial ways. However,
without knowing more about the distribution of mergers and their effects on welfare and
profits, and other relevant factors, it is difficult to draw more specific conclusions.
B. Maintaining Discipline

64

Subject to the caveats discussed in Section III.B. and below.
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Following these rules of thumb for optimal deterrence strategy requires discipline,
that is, a commitment not to deviate from these settlement policies. Discipline is needed
because deviation from the long-run optimal decision and reversion to the short-run
optimal settlement demand would be in the agency’s short-run interest. For example,
after a merger is proposed, if the agency myopically ignores the inevitable effects on
deterrence, the agency might have the incentive to settle for a weaker, welfare reducing
settlement for a harmful merger that involves a significant risk of a false acquittal. It also
might have the incentive to use its bargaining power to extract a small divestiture for a
welfare-enhancing merger.
This guidance can be stated as rules of thumb. The optimal deterrence strategy
does not permit the agency to be “gun shy” about going to court. This is the case even if
the welfare effects from settling would seem favorable, once a litigation discount is
subtracted to account for the litigation risks. On the other side, the agency also must
resist the opportunistic incentive to collect settlement “scalps” for welfare-enhancing
mergers, even if the parties are willing to cave.
There are several impediments to maintaining such a disciplined policy. With respect
to welfare-reducing mergers, agencies do not like to lose in court, as discussed already.
However, there are good reasons why agencies should be less defensive about losses in
court and should not be “gun shy” about bringing cases instead of agreeing to welfarereducing settlements. 65 First, any claim that losses in court imply agency over-reaching
or bad judgment certainly should be discounted. It is well-established in the law and
65

As noted in Section II, supra, the agency win/loss record provides no information on the effectiveness of
deterrence or the overall judgment or skill of the litigating groups. Precedents are often limited because
merger cases are so fact-based. Losses may be harmful, but wins are beneficial. Finally, if there were
more litigated cases, the impact on the law of each case would be reduced, particularly with respect to
outliers.
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economics literature on equilibrium case selection-bias that the win/loss record mainly
reflects differences in the litigants’ costs and benefits of going to trial. In the simplest
situation where the stakes are symmetric, only the hardest cases reach adjudication, and
the equilibrium win/loss rate is 50-50. 66 Deviations from 50-50 reflect asymmetries in
the stakes or unanticipated changes in one-side’s (here, more likely the agency’s)
litigation strategy.
Agencies also might fear that losses in court would adversely affect merger law. 67
Merger cases are very fact-based, which generally should lead to narrow (if any) legal
precedents. 68 But, more generally, if losses in court are harmful, wins are beneficial, and
it is not clear why losses would have larger long-term effects than wins. 69 Moreover,
these effects may be exacerbated today precisely because so few cases are litigated. If
the agencies were to bring more cases, each decision would carry less weight and the
random effects of different courts – especially outlier courts -- might tend to wash out.
The over-reaching claim also relies on the false assumption that the factual
conclusions of the court are superior to the conclusions of the agency in deciding to bring
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Priest & Klein, supra note 3; Steven C. Salop & Lawrence White, Economic Analysis of Private Antitrust
Litigation, 74 GEO. L.J. 1001 (1986).
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At the same time, it is the function of courts to affect the law. Settlements deal the courts out of the
process. See Pitofsky, supra note 5.
68

The possible exception is the attempt by either side to substitute presumptions for facts. Reliance on
presumptions can be a signal of a weak factual case. But arguing for presumptions also can be an explicit
agency strategy to create stronger law for greater future deterrence.
69

Whole Foods provides an interesting example of the way in which judicial opinions can be two-edged
swords. The District Court inexplicably ignored the CEO’s statements about the merger eliminating the
fear of price wars. FTC v. Whole Foods, 502 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007). But, the D.C. Circuit panel then
held that the FTC has a reduced burden of proof for obtaining a preliminary injunction. FTC v. Whole
Foods,548 F.3d 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
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the case. This seems unlikely on the basis of knowledge and experience. 70 A typical
judge in the District of Columbia federal district court might hear one merger case every
5-10 years, and few obtained antitrust experience in the private bar. In contrast, agency
staffs are comprised of lawyers and economists trained in competition analysis. They
develop extensive experience by working full-time on proposed mergers. They work in
teams and argue among themselves, which also should serve to reduce the error rate.
Some might even argue that as a doctrinal matter, courts reach the true conclusion of
whether the merger is anticompetitive as a matter of definition. However, this latter
argument is fundamentally flawed. It is a tenet of the economic analysis of law that
courts face inherently imperfect information. 71 As emphasized in Supreme Court
opinions, generalist courts generate false acquittals (i.e., false negatives) and false
convictions (i.e., false positives). 72 One cannot build a logical jurisprudence on the
concern with false positives/false negatives while simultaneously believing that factual
disagreements between the agency and the court involve the court necessarily being right
and the agency necessarily being wrong.
Discipline also entails the agency foregoing use of its bargaining power to extract
tribute settlements for welfare enhancing mergers. Those settlements can be attractive to
the agency. If well-designed, such settlements can raise welfare. As discussed above,
they also serve the goal of deterrence when they target situations where the merging
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As noted earlier, commentators seem to agree that the agencies are more skilled than the court. See, e.g.,
Sims & Herman, supra note 6, at 898 (“there is no doubt that those at the agencies are more skilled at
understanding and applying complicated economic concepts than the average federal judge or clerk”).
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Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257
(1974); see also C. Frederick Beckner & Steven C. Salop, Decision Theory and Antitrust Rules, 67
ANTITRUST L.J. 41 (1999).
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For example, see Verizon Comm. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
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parties propose an overly broad acquisition that is not inextricably linked to to the overall
welfare benefits of the merger, or where the parties append anticompetitive provisions. 73
Unfortunately, such settlements are potentially subject to overuse or even abuse.
They may interfere with deterrence by reducing at the margin the incentives to propose
welfare-enhancing mergers. Therefore, it is importan that such settlements be reined in.
One way to achieve this goal is by limiting such settlements solely to situations where the
merging parties propose an overly broad acquisition (with elements clearly not
inextricably linked to increasing welfare) or append anticompetitive provisions to an
otherwise beneficial merger.
The latter condition (“append anticompetitive provisions “) represents both a bright
line and involves an indefensible addition to the merger agreement. Thus, it is easy to
justify and enforce, without a significant potential for reducing deterrence. In contrast,
the former condition (“overly broad acquisition”) is not as bright a line and so it could be
subject to misuse. Thus, its usage must be carefully monitored. This also suggests the
benefits of the “just say no” bright line rule as a policy to maintain effective discipline.
C. Maintaining Discipline with the “Just Say No” Enforcement Policy
Discipline also can achieved by making clear commitments to these principles
and rules of thumb. Commitments might be made in pronouncements like the Merger
Guidelines. However, these do not achieve airtight commitments because the Merger
Guidelines do not represent unbreakable vows. It also can difficult for outsiders to
detect deviations from the Guidelines because the analysis is so fact-based. In the end,
the agencies must rely on the establishment of a reputation.
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Section III.B, supra.
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One path to an effective reputation is to adopt a simple and straightforward
policy. Simplicity aids transparency, which speeds the establishment of the agency
reputation. It also deters backsliding because deviation from a simple policy can be
easily and rapidly detected. 74 Thus, even if a more complex policy might have certain
advantages, sacrificing those advantages for simplicity can be a useful trade off.
This approach can be applied to merger enforcement policy. In the analysis of
short-run incentives, we noted that it was not optimal for the agency to commit to a nosettlement policy. In contrast, once deterrence concerns and the benefits of transparency
are taken into account, there can be benefits from a no-settlement commitment. The
policy would function as follows. On the one hand, if the merger is welfare-enhancing
or welfare-neutral, the agency would clear the merger as-proposed. On the other hand, if
the merger is welfare-reducing, the agency would “just say no” and file a complaint. It
would not negotiate or demand a fix. Applying the analogy of just “calling balls and
strikes,” a baseball umpire never negotiates.
Commitment to a “just say no” policy would achieve the greatest deterrence. It
also would address and reduce the concerns of Frankel, Sims and McFalls, and Melamed.
The policy would preven the agency from exacting tribute settlements on welfareenhancing proposed mergers, as desired by Sims and McFalls. The “just say no” feature
of the policy would eliminate the current regulatory approach, as desired by Melamed. If
the agency were forced to “put up or shut up,” agency over-reaching would be deterred.
The merging firms also would have to “put up or shut up.” This would give the firms the
incentive to restructure transactions unilaterally, as desired by Frankel.
74

One of the benefits of the classic Tit-for-Tat strategy for a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game is its
transparency. See Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (1984).
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This more aggressive approach might lead to more cases being litigated in the
short-run while the expectations of the merging parties are adjusting. 75 Litigation costs
would increase, but with large offsetting benefits. An increase in litigation also would
reduce the seeming importance of each individual litigated case. As noted already, in
today’s environment in which merger litigation is a rare event, the outcome of each case
is over-interpreted as a major signal of enforcement policy and legal doctrine. If more
cases were litigated, an outlier court would have less effect. With more cases, the law of
large numbers would begin to come into play and establish real trends, if any. It is also
possible that as courts gain more experience, they might be more inclined to decide each
case on the basis of its particular facts, rather than simply creating legal presumptions.
Or, there might be dueling presumptions by different courts that would lead to the law
advancing.
D. Providing a Role for Balance
This is not to say that there are no benefits to settlements, even occasional
settlements that lead to welfare-reducing outcomes. The concern is whether agency
discipline can be maintained without a just-say-no policy commitment. The overarching
concern is that the focus on settlements can swallow up the enforcement process in highly
counterproductive ways. A focus on settlement implicitly or explicitly encourages
agency staff to focus on the remedy and potential risks in court, rather than on the
75

Moving to the “just say no” policy could raise a practical concern that the agency may not have sufficient
capacity to litigate substantially more merger cases. In my view, this concern likely is a red herring for
several reasons. First, any such capacity limitations would be transitory. If the agencies decided to litigate
more cases, it could recruit and train additional litigators. Well-qualified attorneys would flock to the
agencies for the opportunity to litigate merger cases. Second, in the longer run, litigation frequency would
re-equilibrate at a lower level. Once the agency reputation is established, merging firms would propose
fewer anticompetitive mergers and would restructure others in advance in order to avoid litigation. To
make a simple analogy, a policy of refusing to negotiate with terrorists who take hostages deters hostagetaking.
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competitive impact of the merger. One might frame the point as follows: the first
question the staff should ask is whether the merger as-proposed is welfare-reducing, not
what divestitures might improve the outcome. The “just say no” policy is a way to
change the focus.
Settlements nonetheless can retain a residual policy role even if “just say not”
becomes the norm. Settlements – even welfare-reducing settlements –can be used to
establish an agency foothold in an area. 76 One recent example (albeit in a litigated case)
is the FTC’s order in the already-consummated Evanston Northwestern/ENH merger.
This case might be viewed as a classic pyrrhic victory. 77 The order did not entail a
divestiture but rather consisted of a likely ineffective order mandating that two divisions
of a single firm begin to compete. However, the policy benefit of the case was to show
how such a merger could raise prices, an important finding in light of the string of
previous agency losses in hospital merger cases. 78 At the same time, a settlement like
this is easy to distinguish from backsliding to a short-run strategy.
E. Encouraging Self-Identification, Disclosure and Voluntary Remediation
Deterrence also could be increased by an “advance self-fix” policy to encourage
self-identification and early disclosure of competitive problems and voluntary divestiture
proposals by the merging parties. Notwithstanding the general bargaining advantages
gained by making non-negotiable settlement demands, there can be benefits from ceding
the role to the merging firms in this particular limited way.
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For example, see Pitofsky, supra note 5.
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Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Antimerger Law: Pyrrhic Victories? 12 J. LAW & ECON. 43 (1969).
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The case also led to follow-on private litigation that might have reduced the returns from the merger,
even if it did not reduce prices.
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Current practice requires the agency to identify the competitive problems rather
than encouraging voluntary disclosure by the parties. The merging parties can simply
wait and see if the agency detects the problem. If and when a problem is detected, the
parties then can propose a divestiture and make a binding agreement with the divestiture
buyer. This process reduces deterrence. In addition, under cases like Arch Coal, the
parties can use a voluntary divestiture agreement as the competitive benchmark in the
event that the agency rejects the divestiture and litigates the case in court. 79 This
voluntary divestiture might be made even after the complaint has been filed. This
procedural stance essentially eliminates the ability of the agency to make non-negotiable
settlement demands, which in turn reduces the bargaining power of the agency. Thus,
this procedure also reduces deterrence.
An alternative approach would entitle the merging firms to have the voluntary
divestiture treated as part of the merger transaction for the purpose of competitive effects
analysis, but only if the divestiture agreement is made well before the complaint is issued.
The required timing could be either as part of the initial HSR filing, during Phase 1 of the
HSR process, or before second request compliance is certified. This timing shift would
incentivize the merging parties to identify, disclose and cure the competitive problem in
advance. It thus would increase deterrence. One might refer to this as a credible
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In Arch Coal, the court concluded that Arch's sale of one mine (Buckskin) to a divestiture buyer (Kiewit)
“would be considered as part of the challenged transactions” along with Arch's acquisition in evaluating
“the probable effect of those transactions on competition.” FTC v. Arch Coal. 329 F. Supp. 2d 109, 114115 ( D.D.C. 2004). Other courts also have treated the remedy as part of the transaction to be evaluated,
although there is still an open issue about which side has the burden of proof on remedy. Other recent
cases that raised this issue include United States v. Dairy Farmers of America (2005) and FTC. v. CCC
Holdings (2009). See also Darren S. Tucker, The Elephant in the Room: Litigating the Fix After Arch Coal
and Dairy Farmers, The Antitrust Source (Jan. 2006), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/Jan06_FullSource1_27.authcheck
dam.pdf.
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“advance self-fix” policy, in contrast to the current misnamed “fix-it-first” policy. 80 This
advance self-fix policy requires adjustment of the current Arch Coal approach of
allowing after-the-fact voluntary divestiture agreements to be made part of the
transaction for purposes of evaluating competitive effects.
VI.

Conclusions
This article has analyzed agency merger settlement demands under two alternative

policy assumptions, a short-run optimal policy that focuses only on the merger under
investigation without regard to future deterrence, and a long-run optimal policy that takes
deterrence benefits into account. The criticisms of agency decisions suggest a current
agency approach something along the lines of the short-run policy. The principles and
rules of thumb for long-run deterrence developed here would involve a notable shift in
policy.
This article also suggests further analysis. Much of the analysis in this article has
assumed that the agencies can and do make non-negotiable settlement demands, backed
by a commitment to litigate if the demands are not accepted by the merging firms. This
is not the typical agency bargaining dynamic today. While certain agency bargaining
advantages flow from such a committed strategy, we have also noted certain
shortcomings of this strategy. Negotiations can reveal important information that can
lead to higher welfare. 81 It is possible that these informational benefits may mitigate or
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This advance self-fix proposal thus is very different from the agency “fix-it-first” policy in that fix-it-first
remedies can be proposed at the end of the HSR process but before a complaint is filed. U.S. Dept. of
Justice, Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies (June 2011) at 22, available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/272350.pdf.
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The article implicitly assumes that the agency does not make its settlement demand until all the relevant
information has been revealed. However, to the extent that both sides became more (rather than less) open
during settlement negotiations, such openness could lead to benefits from a negotiation strategy rather than
a commitment strategy. Discovery during the pretrial phrase of litigation also could disclose additional
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trump the benefits to the agency committing to a single non-negotiable offer. Therefore,
further analysis of alternative negotiation strategies would be a useful extension.
This article also suggests that deterrence may be compromised by permitting the
merging parties to make late-minute divestiture agreements that are treated by the court
as part of the merger agreement for the purpose of evaluating competitive effects. At the
same time, consistent with the suggested approach in this article, it has become more
common for merger agreements to commit the acquiring firm to certain potential
divestitures. It would be useful to evaluate these merger agreements in more detail and
analyze the effects of such agreements in settlement negotiations and their impact on
deterrence.
Finally, the analysis of the long-run optimal policy has focused on several policy
rules of thumb, rather than examining alternative policies in the context of a formal
economic model. While it is unlikely that a single model would capture all the
complexity involved in merger settlement policy, developing formal models no doubt
would push our understanding forward. Therefore, additional formal modeling efforts
also would be useful.

information that might lead to productive settlement discussions. These issues are worthy of additional
study.
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Appendix: Formal Model of Short-Run Optimal Settlement Demands

To better expose the logic of the analysis, it is useful to formulate a technical
model of agency behavior. Embedding the analysis in a technical model also permits the
derivation of certain key properties of the short-run optimal settlement strategy.
A merger can be characterized as having a set of structural and market
characteristics that determine the expected impact of the merger on the net present value
(NPV) of economic welfare (whether consumer welfare or aggregate welfare) and profits
of the merging parties. One key characteristic is the set of assets comprising the
transaction. Other characteristics include all the usual market structure factors commonly
investigated in merger analysis –market shares and concentration; ease of entry; diversion
ratios; margins; GUPPIs; elasticity of demand; expansion and repositioning; buyer
power, synergies; factors that facilitate or complicate coordination; etc. 82
A merger proposal can be characterized by its set of structural and behavioral
characteristics. For simplicity, we assume there is a single scalar characteristic y, and the
specific merger is characterized by y=ŷ and NPVs of incremental expected welfare and
profits , denoted by W(y) and П(y) respectively. We assume that all three participants
(the agency, the firms and the court) face imperfect information about welfare and the
agency has unbiased estimates of expected welfare. Incremental welfare and profits can
be affected by a settlement (e.g, a divestiture or other changes that leads to a new
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Certain merger characteristics affect welfare and profits in the same direction. For example, synergies
increase both the incremental profitability and welfare. However, other factors affect welfare and profits in
opposite directions. For example, high barriers to entry likely would lead to higher profits and lower
welfare, other things held constant. Some factors might move welfare and profits in the same direction in
one region but in opposite directions in other regions.
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structure S < ŷ. We focus on divestitures and other remedies that raise welfare but reduce
profits.
The left panel Figure 1A illustrates a merger as-proposed with structure ŷ and
negative expected incremental welfare W(ŷ). The right panel Figure 1B shows the
incremental profits П(ŷ). Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between incremental
welfare and profits for various alternative settlement structures. If the agency demands a
settlement S such that П(S)<0,then the firm would abandon the transaction rather than
accept the settlement. If the proposed merger is abandoned or enjoined, which we
formalize as y=0, then the incremental welfare and profit would equal zero.
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We focus on settlements between M and ŷ that achieve higher welfare W(S)>W(ŷ)
but lower profits П(S)<П(ŷ). As illustrated in Figure 1A, there is a settlement structure
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that leads to welfare-neutrality, which we denote as S=N. There is another settlement
S=M that maximizes welfare. 83
We assume that a court will reject a proposed merger if and only if it concludes
that the expectation is that merger will be welfare-reducing, relative to the no-merger
alternative. We assume that the court is less informed and less expert than the agency, so
there is some probability that it will reach an erroneous outcome. We denote by p(y) the
probability that the court permits a merger with structure y. We assume that the court is
less likely to falsely acquit if the welfare harms are larger, that is, p’(y)<0. For
simplicity, we assume that the agency and the merging parties agree about the probability
of the outcome in court.
In order to estimate the likelihood that its settlement demand would be accepted
by the merging firms, the agency forms expectations about the firms’ incremental
profitability of the merger and their litigation and delay costs, including delay risks. This
might be formalized as follows. The firms would accept a settlement demand S that
would lead to profits П(S) that exceed the firm’s expected profits from litigating, or
П(S) > (1-γ)[p(ŷ)П(ŷ) -CF

(1)

where CF is the merging firms’ out-of-pocket litigation cost, γ is the probability that the
delay will cause the transaction to be terminated by the parties, and p(ŷ) is the probability
that the firm wins in court. Equation (1) assumes for simplicity that the litigation costs
are only borne if the deal is not terminated, though it is likely that in reality there would
be some litigation costs before the deal is terminated.
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If the settlement involves a divestiture that moves the structure of the merger below M, both incremental
welfare and incremental profits fall, so such settlements would never be proposed.
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If the agency had perfect information about equation (1), it could tailor the
maximum settlement demand that the merging firms would accept. 84 However, we
assume that the agency generally has imperfect information about the firms’
profitability. 85 For purposes of the economic model, we assume that the agency forms
an estimate a(S) that the firm will accept a settlement demand S.

We assume that a

weaker settlement offer is more likely to be accepted by the parties (i.e., a’(S)>0).
We assume that the agency makes a non-negotiable, “take it or leave it”
settlement demand, backed up by a commitment to litigate if its demand is rejected by the
firms. The settlement demand S can range at one end from de minimis demand (S~ŷ) that
barely (if at all) affects the welfare impact, up to a large change (S=M) that would lead to
welfare being maximized. An agency absolute decision to litigate is equivalent to
making a settlement demand so large that the merging firms would surely choose to
reject.
The agency chooses the settlement demand S* to maximize expected welfare EW,
that is,

Max EW = a(S)W(S) + (1-a(S)(1-γ)[p(ŷ)W(ŷ) –C]
S

(2)

where W(S) is the agency’s estimate of the expected welfare outcome if the settlement is
accepted, W(ŷ) is the agency’s estimate of expected welfare if the settlement is rejected
and the agency loses in court, a(S) is the agency’s estimate of the likelihood that the
84

We do not focus on the use of settlement demands to reveal asymmetric information. Instead, we simply
focus on the parties have differential beliefs as a result of limited information on both sides. We also will
not analyze the structure of the imperfect information, at least initially. Instead, we will make assumptions
about the impact of the imperfect information on the parties’ subjective probabilities of the court’s decision
on liability and the likelihood that the other party will accept a settlement offer rather than litigate.
Perhaps the most significant missing information is the delay risk factor γ, the probability that the
litigation delay will cause the deal to crater.
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settlement is rejected by the merging parties, p(ŷ) is the probability that the agency loses
in court, γ is the probability that the deal is terminated voluntarily as the result of the
agency complaint, and C is the agency’s opportunity cost of litigation. 86
This model assumes that the agency commits to litigating if its settlement demand
is rejected. The agency does not bluff. While equation (2) describes the short-run
optimal policy that takes the structure of the merger as given and ignores deterrence
effects, the agency’s policies will have effects on the structure of future proposed
mergers.
With imperfect information and positive litigation costs, the agency’s short-run
optimal settlement demand balances the benefits and costs of making a marginally
tougher settlement demand. The first-order condition can be stated formally as follows.

W(S*) - (1-γ)[p(ŷ)W(ŷ) - C] = - W’(S*)(a/a’)

(3)

Intuitively, the agency has the incentive to choose the settlement demand that
equates the marginal benefit to the marginal cost. This tradeoff can be stated in the form
of a marginal risk-reward ratio. The term on the right-hand side reflects the marginal
risk/reward tradeoff.

The reward is that the marginal increase in expected welfare

aW’(S). The risk is the marginal reduction in the likelihood that the settlement will be
accepted a’(S). The larger is the ratio of marginal reward to marginal risk, the less
greater will be the agency’s incentive to demand a more aggressive settlement
commitment.

86

We assume for simplicity that the agency anticipates a zero probability that the merger proposal will be
abandoned rather than litigated, a condition that is satisfied if П(M) > 0.
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Equation (3) also explains why the agency may take a less aggressive position
towards more anticompetitive mergers, that is, those with more negative W(ŷ). While the
the likelihood of a false acquittal p(ŷ) will be lower for such mergers, the expected
welfare harm p(ŷ)W(ŷ)<0 may become more negative. In this situation, the agency
would more to fear from an aggressive settlement demand. As a result, , the agency
would have the incentive to be more accommodative by demanding a weaker settlement
S*.
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